This introduction highlights the diversity of national localities, research methods, case studies, and topics covered by the papers selected for inclusion in the special issue on "Planning and foresight methodologies in emergency preparedness and management." It then provides a detailed summary of each study, emphasizing what the editors feel are the most important contributions. Concluding remarks include a call for future studies that are needed. An example is planning for ways of supporting and integrating citizen participation in all phases of crisis management, a topic that is missing from this collection.
Introduction
In soliciting and selecting articles for this issue, we explicitly wanted to make sure that we represented the diversity of work on planning and forecasting for large scale emergencies. Disasters threaten all societies, everywhere in the world, but there is great variety in the way disaster management is organized in different countries and even in different parts of the same nation. Therefore, first, we wanted to make sure that we have work that spans many different nations, and indeed, we do, including Australia, Cyprus, Finland, Israel, Italy, Malaysia, Romania, Spain, and the U.K., as well as the United States. Secondly, we wanted to include the perspectives of actual managers and practitioners, not just academics; two of the papers selected are case studies by practitioners. Finally, we wanted to include a variety of methods of study, and we have papers based on case studies, unstructured interviews, coding and statistical analysis of the results of a literature review, surveys, and modeling.
Case studies and related aspect papers
We are fortunate to have two very detailed case studies of a large scale disaster in this special issue. Good case studies in emergency management are hard to come by. From detailed case studies, we can learn about why failures and errors occurred and what we can do to learn how to improve all the phases of emergency management. The theories of behavior for High Reliability Organizations and the associated suggested "Science of Muddling Through" point out strongly that those organizations must seek out and expose any errors or harm that their organization does so they can be corrected to better handle future emergencies [1, 2] . Unfortunately, this clear need to understand and improve past performance in disaster planning and response is not the case in most organizations. There is more concern with public images, liability concerns, and political repercussions. It is from the disasters that represented clear failures in response that we have the opportunity to gain insights that are needed to improve planning and response [3] .
Both of these case studies use the framework developed by Turner [4] . Turner examined 84 official accidents and associated reports over an eleven year period, published by the British Government. He points out that in the intervals of time between major similar disasters there is decay of awareness and preparation, which is the major cause of poor response to the next similar disaster incident. His framework of the six stages of a disaster is very insightful for guiding an analysis of the fundamental causes of poor planning and foresight as well as the resulting poor response ( Table 1) . As one reads these two cases, it is easy to see how four recent major disaster response failures can easily be fitted into the same framework: Katrina, the BP Gulf Oil Spill, the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, and Hurricane Sandy.
The Turner framework serves to uncover many of the fundamental causes of the "failures of foresight" [5, p. 121] that rarely become explicit in the typical "official report" in the past or the present. We offer two summary tables from the Turner paper that give a quick overview of that framework, which is relevant to a good number of the other papers in this collection, consistent with individual points made in Table 2 .
One significant feature missing in the incubation period is the conflict in goals and objectives. For a lot of recent disasters one can identify the reduction of maintenance costs, reducing infrastructure investment, and similar decisions which can save immediate costs or raise profits, but which reduce safety and increase risk. An example today is typified by the BP Gulf Disaster [6] . This is an extrapolation of the last item in the features of the incubation period in state II.
The specifics of the two large scale disaster case studies follow.
The failure of foresight in crisis management: a secondary analysis of the Mari disaster (Panos Constantinides)
This is an analysis of a large explosion in a naval base in Cyprus in July 2011 which killed 13 people and injured 62 others while completely destroying the major power plant on the island. This paper examines how foresight into crisis management decisions was compromised by red tape, bureaucracy, poor communication and poor information flows.
The emphasis in this analysis focuses on the problem of communications among many diverse organizations in governmental, public, and private roles. It shows a lack of the exchange of important information, the lack of exchanging and collaboration on plans and the limited approach of not considering how one disaster can trigger others. Clearly, there was no perception of disasters in one area triggering disasters in other areas. This paper deals with the challenges to the Victoria State disaster plan before and during the "Black Saturday" Australian bushfires of February, 2009 where 173 persons perished. This involved over 300 separate large fires and 1000 smaller fires burning simultaneously with over 50% of the Murrindindi Shire council area of Victoria being under fire. Given that fires are a very serious and frequent problem in Australia and that the area had a long history of droughts and fires, there seemed to be a buildup of over-confidence in the existing plans and preparedness.
It turned out that in the incubation stage there seemed to be quite a few unnoticed failings in regulatory land-use planning and building codes and laws. Emergency planning did not keep up with the spread of numerous small towns in a very fire-prone area, and maintenance, such as controlled burning of forests for fuel load reduction, was not sufficient. An increasing number of "strangers" moved into the area who did not understand the possibility of a compound threat made up of a long term drought (13 years) and a severe heatwave period. No public body seemed to want to contemplate the possibility of the extreme disaster that did occur (a fire storm). Just about all the phenomena that Turner developed in his framework influenced the occurrence of this disaster.
In this disaster, the increasingly narrow focus of risk management over time was what Turner referred to as the "decoy problem" that distracted from the more dangerous but ill-structured problem by substituting a less severe well-defined and well-structured problem. This major fallacy of planning in ignoring the real ill-structured problems by substituting simpler well structured problems plagues many types of planning today. Planning and foresight should include the development of three related understandings:
1. What has occurred since the last similar disaster that might increase the expected risks and damage? 2. What can be done to make the response more effective? 3. What can be done to mitigate the potential recovery problems?
Today, dynamic modeling often focuses on the response phase and ignores the other periods of the process. These models are used to train people to understand the assumed threat and the response to it more than they are used in making longer term investment decisions. To do that, we really need models for all three periods that can integrate, so the results of the incubation period can feed into the response stage model, and both those models can feed into the recovery stage model. An excellent candidate for this is the recent Sandy disaster in the Northeast United States. A prior occurrence of this type and location of disaster was the 1938 hurricane [7] . Many of the current local political leadership claim Sandy was a complete surprise and unique and some of the same problems that occurred in the past are reoccurring in the current recovery period.
The following three papers highlight and discuss specific problems that Turner included in Table 2 . Most of these focus on communication problems within and between organizations involved with emergency response.
Communication issues: a study in Finland (Kimmo Laakso and Jari Palomaki)
This article includes an observation by the chair of the Accident Investigation Board in Finland that "The situation in a disaster is never so bad that poor communication and flow of information cannot change things for the worse." The first part of this paper describes an accident in which incorrect information about the nature of a chemical spill made the situation much worse. It goes on to argue for the need for the development of a common ontology in order to support cross-sector communication among the different organizations that will be involved in any large scale emergency. An initial framework for developing such an ontology is presented, emphasizing communication and interactions among actors who belong to "different organizations representing different organizational cultures, including different usage of language."
The paper then moves on to the first of a planned series of empirical studies that focuses on such actors in Finland. Conceived of as a multi-round Delphi, 35 different types of organizations were invited to participate, representing government authorities, private companies, and volunteer organizations. They nominated 48 experts experienced in emergency management to take part. Open ended questions in a face to face interview were used in this first round, to gather participants' accounts of challenges or problems they have noticed in inter-organizational communication during disaster response. Among the top problem domains identified were:
1. Situation awareness and the flow of information; 2. Inadequacy of current "drills" for actually being prepared to function smoothly; and 3. Communication at the time of impact and immediately after.
In regard to issues 1 and 3 above, one of the most significant factors is the lack of inter-operability among the data systems used by different authorities and organizations. Often this is deliberate, because the organization does not want to share its data with others. In terms of issue 2, the drills are described as generally being related to "routine" or small scale accidents, rather than major disasters that would require units from several different organizations to respond and cooperate. They also felt that the participants for the required yearly drills did not take them very seriously (as many people do not take fire drills seriously) and that they did not result in improved planning.
As with other studies in this issue based on a single company, or even a single organization, the issue of generalizability to other contexts is raised. The Finnish authors plan to have a more structured set of subsequent rounds administered through an Internet based Delphi procedure. It would be good if such studies could be replicated in several different national contexts. There are countries that only recently emerged from very centralized and rigid bureaucracies where everything was determined from the top down with little input from the population. Often these countries had only very limited disaster response activities and little effective local planning feeding into the centralized processes. The next paper is an attempt to improve on the lack of adequate two-way communication in emergency management.
A case study of changing emergency management in Romania (Marian Zulean and Gabriela Prelipcean)
The majority of published studies about emergency management are about the U.S. and other "first world" western nations. However, the majority of nations in the world do not fit into this category. Many, like Romania, are in a situation where they have been undergoing a transformation in the organization of emergency preparedness and response, from an authoritarian structure under the direction of the military and focused mainly on war-related disasters, to a decentralized and civilian-controlled structure focused both on natural or man-made disasters. A two part study reviews the historical evolution of planning and managing disasters in Romania and presents an empirical study of the views of current Romanian managers about the most important risks the nation faces and the current degree of planning and preparation to deal with them.
Earthquakes (most notably one in 1977) and floods have been the most damaging natural disasters in the past, with extreme temperatures also causing many fatalities recently. The first part of this article gives the history of the organizational transformation and the problems encountered. Romania's recent membership in NATO and the EU accelerated efforts to organize and reorganize emergency preparedness and response, based on county units, under the direction of the Ministry of the Interior. However, a World Bank report concluded that there is still a need to improve Romania's environmental, social, and economic vulnerability to natural disasters and mining accidents, especially in terms of implementing risk reduction measures and reducing the fragmentation of the current organization, which is based on separate lead institutions for each type of event.
The second part of the paper is forward looking, based on a three round online Delphi study that included participation by 30 of the 42 emergency management counties in Romania. One interesting result was that the managers saw large scale forest fires as the second ranking threat after earthquakes, and this type of disaster has not been given national priority. They also noted a very low level of preparation for possible nuclear disasters (e.g., related to power plants), and for earthquakes, even though the latter has been a focus of national attention. The managers perceive a strong need to improve the preparation of the population for dealing with risks, including the possible local effects of terrorist actions (a disaster type currently relegated almost entirely to the domestic intelligence organization), and also for improved risk mitigation; in other words, a shift in emphasis from "response" to "planning." Moreover they suggested that an "integrated management" approach -to include a functional Emergency Management Information System (EMIS) -will overcome the institutional gap created by decentralization and will improve the communication for risk governance.
Planning in the emergency operations center (EOC) (Michael Ryan)
Michael Ryan's practitioner's paper is a significant insight into the ongoing consequences and paradoxes of the situation that EOCs in the U.S. face. Very few papers really disclose what goes wrong in this sort of Center. The organizations involved in responding to disasters are very reluctant to talk or provide information on what has gone wrong and what sort of errors are made. This is contrary to the philosophy of creating High Reliability Organizations [1] . A prior detailed case study of what can go wrong in an EOC which had passed all the standards and approvals necessary [3] shows how the problems discussed here can ultimately defeat the effective operation of the center in a real disaster.
The local EOC involves many organizations and professionals that are not activated as a team until a disaster is imminent. This fundamental problem has been mentioned in other sources, but rarely has anyone carefully itemized the specific problems that can occur. While this is focused on county level EOCs in the United States, one can infer that similar problems occur elsewhere in the world. Clearly, the success of the EOC operation is very much dependent upon what many other organizations do for preparedness and collaboration before the disaster looms.
Another factor relevant to the actual response to a disaster is that much of the information coming into the center is based upon verbal inputs and even much of the outgoing communication is transmitted verbally. When there are many verbal sources dealing with overlapping information and no comparable dynamic record that can be automatically checked for confusions, there are problems even in everyday emergency systems such as the allocation of ambulances [8] .
We start with hundreds to thousands of managers and professionals who are interdisciplinary in nature, some of whom will have had no actual experience in a real disaster, attempting to work together in small teams on solving complex problems by recognizing the current reality and potential conflicts for the timely allocation of resources. Every organization has their own plans to be carried out and to be dynamically modified to meet new challenges. We have to realize that often the vast majority of communications will occur verbally over phones and direct verbal interactions. Many of the participants from the organizations, and public citizens, who have key information to contribute, will not have access to or membership in the underlying Incident Command System (ICS). Another paper in this special issue (Laakso, Palomaki) illustrates how this restriction to verbal transfers of information can lead to critical errors or confusion.
Other noticeable challenges are the lack of:
• Training, especially for new people who have not gone through prior disasters • Feedback for the reality of current situations (situation awareness)
• Resiliency refers to a community's ability to function and recover when faced with crises, and should be an important element affecting emergency response plans. One component is the quality of infrastructure and services in the community, and the other component is social. Measuring and validating a perceived resiliency was done by a survey process. The sample used was 886 adults in nine small to medium sized towns in Israel. The study is based on a questionnaire, which can be obtained from the authors upon request for use by other researchers.
Analysis of the pattern of responses shows that CCRAM consists of six factors: Leadership, Collective efficacy (defined as "social cohesion among neighbors, combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good"), Preparedness, Place attachment, Social trust and Social relationships. The use of the CCRAM tool is suggested for taking periodic measures to see if actions need to be taken to improve the readings on the dimensions, and as an aid for planning for emergencies.
Five papers on modeling
Modeling disasters is an important component of both planning and training in emergency management. We have two papers which are concerned with using groups to create and use models. They both use two approaches to the building of dynamic scenarios. One uses the very popular System Dynamics Modeling but with an emphasis on using a group of professionals to collectively determine the interaction variables to be used. The other one uses the Cross Impact approach applied to the hypothetical explosion of a dirty bomb in an urban area. It places an emphasis on how to get consistent quantitative estimates from a small group of estimators. The protocols developed may be used with larger groups to estimate the subjective probabilities of the interacting events.
While the vast majority of modeling activities emphasize the response phase of emergency management, we have one that emphasizes the recovery stage. It is a model for determining where are the most desirable localities to rebuild living areas after the L'Aquila Earthquake in Italy. This also represents the sort of approach that should be taken to land use planning in any area likely to be subjected to earthquakes. We lack models that integrate the incubation period of Turner [4] into the response and recovery period. The lack of consideration of land use risks is one of the most significant oversights.
While all the model efforts take very different approaches, it is of interest to compare them. They all involve use of professionals to create or interpret the model through a group process and to create a tool that can give insights to others who wish to understand what can happen and what can be done to encourage good outcomes rather than bad ones.
Tabletop exercises are very common as an approach to modeling a given disaster involvement and to train people to recognize the complexities of the potential disaster they are addressing. Many tabletops focus on making the local leadership aware of things they normally don't think about with respect to potential disaster situations. There is rarely any systematic attempt to capture and utilize the results of such "enlightenment" exercises. The third paper on modeling focuses on actually assessing the resulting group process to determine the confidence of the participants who are for the most part individuals that would have to assume active roles in the given disaster process.
Decision trees are a support tool that uses a tree-like model of decisions and their possible consequences. Decision trees are commonly used in decision analysis, to help identify a strategy most likely to reach a goal. The fifth modeling paper is based on this technique and it illustrates the use of a simple, integrative but sharp decision-making tool for further testing towards enhancing city resilience and sustainability. This paper aims at modeling multiple stakeholder activities when dealing with critical infrastructures in a crisis situation. The authors develop three formal simulation models to analyze crises from three different temporal perspectives: crisis peak, whole lifecycle of a single crisis and multiple crises. The information gathering process to develop simulation models consisted of a series of facilitated workshops among a diverse group of experts representing stakeholders in a specific critical infrastructure such as a distributed power grid. In the study, the infrastructure system can be examined by employing a Group Modeling Building (GMB) process and a resulting System Dynamics (SD) simulation of their inputs. The reason diverse stakeholders are included is that the results of different types of outages and response actions can be used to see the impacts on different aspects of a crisis area. The authors developed a set of four different simulated outages to show different emergency situations that stimulate the thinking of emergency managers. They are able through the SD models to look at short and long term consequences such as coordination aspects in response, cost of recovery, and the effectiveness of preventive measures and lessons learned.
The stimulus of the models for a diverse group of emergency managers is to be able to define clusters of mitigation policies, actions that increase resiliency, and improved preparation for future crisis situations. This generates insights in maintenance, infrastructure adequacy and redundancy, internal training, external training, legal and regulatory clarity, lessons learned, information exchange, and communication via public and social media. This paper is a follow on to an earlier paper in TFSC dealing with the theory behind the modeling method used in this paper [9] . It deals with creating a model of this type for a potential terrorist action. Harold Linstone was the editor for this paper and his description of the paper follows within the quotes.
"Scenarios provide a basis for group decision making in emergency management. The paper introduces the use of Cross-Impact Analysis combined with Interpretive Structural Modeling (CIA-ISM). The first activity is the creation of an event set where each event is proposed by experts and evaluated by them for its significance in their collaborative building of the model. Group processes such as Delphi or brainstorming may be helpful at this stage. The second activity is estimation of the cross-impact probability relationships; that is, does occurrence of event A increase or decrease the likelihood of event B or have no effect during the next 24 hours?To illustrate the application of CIA-ISM, a potential terrorist attack with a dirty bomb is described which involves the release of radioactive Cesium contaminating 16 square blocks in an urban area and affecting 30,000 to 40,000 people. In building the model there are assumed initial conditions, such as bomb recognition by trained firemen, and dynamic events such as a medical responder demanding a radiation detector within the first hour of the explosion. Outcome events include, for example, "city isolation" until contamination detection for all citizens is conducted, and "short term success" with 80% of those contaminated being detected and decontaminated within 24 hours. Digraphs play a prominent role in this analysis in terms of illustrating graphically the relative impact of each event upon the other events. It should be noted that CIA-ISM makes it easy to combine the subjective estimations of influences of any type of physical events with the subjective estimations of influences of behavioral events."
Besides developing a dynamic event model of the results of a dirty bomb explosion in an urban area, this paper discusses the process three people (the authors) had to go through to develop a consistent group estimation of the cross impact factors for four source events, ten dynamic events, and four outcome events.
Improving public health emergency preparedness through enhanced decision-making environments: a simulated and survey based evaluation (Ozgur Araz and Megan Jehn)
High-level plans cannot be adapted to and implemented in local environments unless the emergency managers are educated about the plans and their action options for specific types of scenarios, and have some opportunity during training exercises to practice in a realistic manner. A key issue is whether a specific type of training for plan implementation and perhaps plan improvement is actually effective. This paper describes a project that can assist others in providing a methodology for such assessment of training.
The specific scope of the training described in this paper is limited; it deals with decisions school districts can make to try to mitigate the health and social impacts of a pandemic, specifically an H1N1 pandemic. The Arizona project developed a "table top" exercise that is simulation-driven and uses media to create a realistic, immersive decision-making environment. Not just emergency managers participated, but also other stakeholders, such as members of parentteacher associations. When schools are closed to try to decrease contagion, parents need to find alternate ways to have their children educated, cared for, and fed, if they have jobs outside of the home, and this can cause serious disruption to the community. As the authors describe it, the simulation model allowed the participants to "discuss and evaluate decision processes during the exercise while viewing the real-time simulated impacts (e.g., percentage of the population infected, duration of outbreak, costs of school closures, etc.) of their decisions."
However, the main contribution of the paper is not the description of the training itself, but the fact that a series of three surveys was built into the training sessions to assess changes in knowledge and confidence of the decision makers as a result of the training program. It should be noted that there were statistically significant improvements on most measures, but the confidence levels of the participants were high even before the training, in this case. Though the specific study is limited to one type of crisis in one state in the U.S., the paper has implications for community level interventions and political level decision making in crisis events of different types and in different locations.
Spatial connectivity as a recovery process indicator: the L'Aquila Earthquake (Diana Maria Contreras Mojica, Thomas Blaschke, Stefan Kienberger, and Peter Zeil)
This paper develops measures of spatial connectivity to integrate variables such as distance, travel time, and quality of public transportation for determining the satisfaction of citizens to move to new settlements in an earthquake recovery process. They determined for this Italian city that a meaningful correlation between the new settlements and the inner city strongly influences the preference to either stay or to move. Even though the earthquake occurred about four years ago, L'Aquila is still in an early recovery phase of restoration. It was observed, based upon the results, that it is preferable to plan recovery by specific activities to be carried out spatially (by location) rather than by periods of time for specific infrastructures independent of location. It is also observed that problems with urban services, facilities, and transport usually come from the lack of community involvement in the recovery plan and its implementation. The recovery process, especially in Europe, is often focused on restoring quickly major historical sites, to the detriment of optimized public services and infrastructure.
Dynamic decision trees for building resilience into future eco-cities (Ioan M. Ciumasu)
This paper illustrates the application of dynamic decision trees for developing city sustainability. The paper proposes a reformulation, in terms of urban risk management, of an earlier developed ontological scenario generation method [10] . The method consists of a series of steps leading to identification and prioritization of pressures (seen as sources of systemic risk) followed by responses to questions in an informed order of priorities. The author illustrates the methodological proposal in the concrete context of the city of Iasi (Romania). The case presents and discusses four ontological scenarios along a dynamic decision tree: Receding City, Wanting City, Promising City and Inspiring City. This reflects a set of three top priorities formulated as questions to be answered by the community: (1) implementation of a business-friendly and efficient governance system, (2) development of a resource management system, and (3) carrying out a human capital accelerator strategy. The scenarios are discussed in terms of systemic risks at the end of post-communist transition and beginning of the socio-economic convergence with Western Europe.
The focus of the article is planning towards sustainable cities. Although at first glance the subject is rather exotic to this journal, it deserves a place in this special issue in the sense that emergency/disaster preparedness is an essential part of sustainability. What is of particularly great value is the paper's attempt to bridge the world of the 'business as usuallow tempo mode' on the one hand, and the 'emergency preparedness -up-tempo mode', on the other hand. The research findings have the potential of constituting a basis for further elaboration of a 'design for the exceptional' approach. The interesting thing here is that this is done by drawing on insights from more mainstream disciplines such as governance, business development, and resource management. In that way, an intertwining of insights can take place with the result that best practices from emergency and crisis management studies become more mainstream.
Specific comprehensive studies
4.1. A Delphi-based risk analysis -identifying and assessing future challenges for supply chain security in a multi-stakeholder environment (Christoph Ulrich Markmann, Igna-Lena Darkow, Heiko von der Gracht)
We have seen a great many disruptions of supply chains due to ignoring potential natural disasters in areas where supply sources have been built, or the lack of accountability of local governments to take actions to mitigate such risks. This paper presents the results of collaborative problem solving via a Delphi exercise to expose and examine such risks for supply chains. Too many companies do not really involve themselves in assessing the location of the actual sources of their supplies. Nor do they carefully expose and assess the risks that those sources may face. In today's complex international production society the problems of insuring the success of a given supply chain or even being aware of the risks is a "wicked" problem. The authors have done a very complete investigation of this area and made excellent use of the Delphi Method. There is valuable material in this paper to allow a given company to establish an online continuous assessment process among professionals to expose and monitor the status of the risks and reactions to them for its own supply chains. It is a clear business continuity contribution.
A survey of the literature on knowledge management as a part of EMIS (Emergency Management Information Systems) (Magiswary Dorasamy, Murali Raman and Maniam Kaliannan)
This study describes the nature of "applied" studies of the use of Knowledge Management systems to prepare for or respond to emergencies. By "applied," the authors mean that the paper is about an actual system, and not a theoretical paper. Knowledge Management (KM) is defined as "the practice of selectively applying knowledge from previous experiences of decision making to current and future decision making for the express purpose of improving the organization's effectiveness." It is clear that any EMIS has to be based upon the design of a knowledge structure relevant to this application area.
The authors located 51 published papers in refereed journals and conference proceedings during the last 20 years, which focused on disasters. It is noteworthy that a search of standard databases for articles on the intersection of KM and emergency management (EM) was not very fruitful. There were over 8000 papers on KM, but only about 1% of them are on KMS for disasters or emergencies. (This is actually their first finding; that KM has not adequately been studied in the domain of EM). More fruitful was searching journals (e.g., IJISCRAM) and special issues of journals specifically on EMIS, as well as conferences with tracks on this topic (e.g., HICSS) or devoted to the topic (e.g. ISCRAM). One reason that the direct search was more fruitful is that only about half of the qualifying papers located actually explicitly used the term "KM" or "Knowledge Management."
The most valuable part of this paper for most readers will be Table 5 in their paper, which lists 51 papers and shows the name of the system studied, a description of the system and of its EM focus, and the method used to study the system (most frequently, case study). The statistical analysis of the set of papers identifies gaps in the literature; for instance, there has been very little use of KMS-EMIS for pre-disaster stages thus far, including training and preparedness (planning and forecasting). Based on analysis of the studies, the authors conclude with design guidelines for KMS/EMIS systems.
One specific and interesting result of this paper is the concept of creating roles for emergency management that are embedded in the software and which can be taken on by any user trained for that role. This is a recent concept in both Knowledge Management and Software Engineering. The paper summarizes the roles that have been defined in the reviewed literature. The "things" in the Internet of Things (IoT) are "any real or virtual participating actors such as real world objects, human beings, virtual data, and intelligent software agents. The purpose of the IoT is to create an environment in which the basic information from any one" can be shared with others in real time.
The authors first describe the technological components which enable real time sensor data, for instance the readings of water levels on the Zambezi River, to be made available to emergency managers or others. These include RFID and wireless sensor network technologies, which enable any device, such as a sensing device, to be located or tracked and queried about whatever it is measuring, such as temperature or smoke ingress or local gaseous composition; it is easy to see how such data would be useful to first responders. Wireless communication technologies span the gap between the "things" and the Internet, and data fusion technologies allow the aggregation and integration of many different pieces of data from different "things."
After describing the technologies, the authors address several research questions, such as how the IoT can enhance Emergency Response. The domain chosen for this investigation is fire safety. An inductive approach was used to identify patterns and generate hypotheses, based on interviews with a total of 60 members of three fire and rescue services in the UK. Results support the hypothesis that use of the IoT can improve accountability of resources and personnel (e.g., give an accurate count of resources and personnel on a scene); assessment of the situation (e.g., support fast and accurate situation awareness); assist in dynamic resource allocation decisions; and support multi-organizational coordination (e.g., track remaining resources of each organization). Thus, the IoT can greatly enhance the carrying out and modification of plans as a disaster unfolds. The application of the IoT to emergency response in other domains and other nations promises to be a rich area for future research and development, as a part of any overall emergency planning and forecasting effort. This paper focuses on stressing the need for Information Technology-enabled planning environments, either at the national or organization-specific levels, which can lead to more uniform plans, easier to evaluate and share, with support to stakeholders. The paper includes a survey of how emergency plans are managed in nine countries around the world. Based on the study of these countries, the authors enumerate the basic requirements for emergency plan management improvement and propose SAGA, a framework that supports the full lifecycle of emergency plan management. SAGA provides all the actors involved in plan management a number of tools to support all the stages of the plan lifecycle. SAGA is aimed at covering the administrative aspects of emergency plan management; it also provides support for emergency plan designers via a reuse-enforcing development environment. Access to information relevant to practitioners is provided by the SAGA Digital Library, which consists of different repositories holding plans, plan fragments, and other resources. The paper outlines the architecture of the system, and shows with a case study how planning processes can benefit from a system like SAGA. By means of the case study the authors illustrate how despite the initial effort required to create content, once content is available, the SAGA reusing mechanisms notably ease the development of plans.
The paper discusses the potential benefits of utilizing the software they have developed to allow organizations to share, compare, and improve existing plans for similar organizations and facilities. It is clear that this process does not exist today; however, it is very much wanted by those responsible for developing emergency plans in existing organizations. Too many plans are not good because they are often contracted out to the cheapest source and not taken seriously. Who can forget that the BP plan for an oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico called for saving the walruses? That was a clear indicator that the plan supplied was never read carefully.
A framework for agro-terrorism intentions detection using overt data sources (Eli Rohn and Gil Erez)
This paper provides a framework for reducing agro-terrorism related risks by means of early detection of exotic/foreign pathogenic agents and their dispersion patterns. The paper defines agro-terrorism as a hostile damaging action on an agricultural gamut that includes infrastructure, inputs, processes, and products, intentioned to substantially harm domestic or international interests of the attacked, in order to advance political objectives of the attacker. In spite of large investments in fighting against terrorism threats, agro-terrorism has received very little attention in this regard. In order to contribute to this research effort the paper identifies weaknesses among the intelligence community that must be addressed and integrates the classic intelligence cycle for early detection that may lead to prevention of such acts. It is made clear that such a threat can have a large and significant impact and one might have a severe problem distinguishing between unintentional and intentional occurrences of food contamination. The growing international trade in an ever wider range of food and beverage products provides significant opportunities for the occurrence of terrorist activities in this area. It is not clear that measures of prevention and detection are keeping up even with detecting unintentional threats. The recent public discovery of the wide scale use of horsemeat to augment beef products in the European Union has caused considerable negative public reaction. The mislabeling of fish cuts to artificially increase prices is another example of the lack of mechanisms to detect and prevent even those abuses based upon profit motives, let alone what might occur for terrorism objectives.
The authors emphasize that early detection of data is the best risk-management approach, when feasible, because it would help to enable preventive measures. In this sense, the development of agro-terrorism early warning policies and supportive technologies requires harnessing current knowhow and augmenting it to meet the potential forthcoming challenges. To reach this aim the authors gather different sources of knowledge into a framework. This heterogeneity of references brings to this research a very practice-oriented application and it is one of the main added value points of the paper. One would hope that there are significant national and international efforts to improve and develop mechanisms of detection and prevention; however, that is not publicly obvious. Another of the main contributions of this research is its focus on the collection of intelligent data. The very large number of threats derived from the nature of agroterrorism indicates that the variety of relevant data is significant and tightly related to the potential target. The authors discuss some key issues for carrying out intelligent data gathering based on information technology (mostly Internet-based technology) in order to support the early detection of agroterrorism acts.
Conclusions and observations
It is clear from this collection of papers that planning and resulting activities like mitigation and improved investments in infrastructure are not functioning the way they should be in the general area of Emergency Preparedness and Management. One hopes the area of terrorism is handled well as it does appear to receive more attention and funding. Given the large number of threats that are possible in the next decade [11] ; we need to see far more efforts at planning and foresight for emergencies and exposure of the results of these activities to the public. The hope is that the public will encourage the leadership to undertake more of the efforts at mitigation and preparedness that the planning and foresight efforts indicate should be undertaken.
Some of the papers used two older "classic" references. We consider these two papers as very fundamental with respect to their potential emphasis on planning, foresight, and mitigation in the disaster field. One by Dynes and Quarantelli [12] reviewed thirty years of research into organizational behavior in responding to disasters. It points out a large number of considerations that today's organizations do not recognize about the differences between effective and non-effective responses to disasters. The second is the Turner framework [4] for uncovering the reasons for poor planning. Both of these papers deserve more rediscovery by the current generation of professionals concerned with improving all the phases of disaster investigations.
Turner's framework [4] offers an interesting challenge for planning and, in particular, modeling. It indirectly indicates that if we wish to understand the true nature of a specific type of disaster on a particular type of location we should in fact understand fully how three different phases of the process interact over time.
1. The incubation period between occurrences of two similar disasters, 2. The response period, 3. The extended recovery period.
If we want to undertake meaningful planning there must be an understanding of all three periods and how each one influences the next one in this cycle of disaster states. The same set of states will repeat in later cycles of disasters of a similar nature and magnitude. For example, for the Cross Impact modeling approach, this presents a rather interesting opportunity [13] . One could actually build three separate models of this process. They could easily be integrated into one overall model by the outcome events overlapping greatly the source assumptions for the next model in the cycle, and the final recovery process outcomes being the source assumptions for the incubation period. In other words, it would be relatively easy to expand the Cross Impact approach to an integrated model across all the necessary phases and create a three step dynamic model that could become a comprehensive planning tool. This integration of the three phases into what becomes a cyclic process allows us to integrate the impact of risk formulation from the incubation period all the way to the consequences of the recovery phase. This is a little more difficult to do in System Dynamics but the most reliable System Dynamics models are the ones that demonstrate cyclic or recurrent behavior [14] . There seems to be a very common behavior across these three phases that are in principle a complete cycle between occurrences of similar disasters:
1. A major disaster of a specific type occurs. 2. A response occurs that is not considered a real success. 3. Much activity in the recovery focuses on how a disaster of this type can be mitigated in the future and a number of innovations and changes take place.
Time passes after the recovery and because of various pressures, preparedness takes a back seat. In a few decades or even less there is much pressure to use finances for other purposes and more and more people that have not lived through the last occurrence of this major disaster. The next time the same type of disaster occurs in the same large strength, the resulting response is once again poor, and we continue the cycle.
So we can have interesting and significant models for planning using System Dynamics as well. However, given that well defined physical interactions are more easily modeled in System Dynamics, and behavioral properties are more easily modeled in Cross Impact, there may be situations where the two methods can be integrated as part of the same modeling effort. Whatever the approach to planning, the Turner framework definitely shows us the serious consequences of ignoring planning and mitigation in the incubation period, and the potential for greatly increased damages and problems the longer effective planning and mitigation are ignored. Models that integrate the complete process are what are needed to make the penalties of ignoring mitigation clear to both the leadership and the public. It is also what is needed to carry out very good foresight studies which must integrate the above phases to claim relevancy for decision making that truly allows the reduction of risks from effective planning. In spite of the relevance of the national/supranational research agendas of security and emergency management there is a lack of foresight studies in this area that cover fully the stages of Turner's model. Nevertheless we recommend two valuable efforts in this direction. At the supranational level there is the European Security Research and Innovation Forum [15] , supported by the European Commission; at a national level, the efforts made by the UK Foresight program such as Reducing Risks of Future Disasters [16] .
While this issue includes a very rich and useful set of material, we did feel that at least one area was significantly missing. The growing involvement of citizens in the response phase of disasters is a recent phenomenon paralleling the growth of social media systems [17] . There has been some recent work on this area [18] with respect to investigating and understanding it. However, what is truly missing is to look at what could be done to design for this trend and integrate it and citizen participation into all the phases of disasters. There is in the literature on this subject some very significant suggestions but very little supporting R&D. Among the options that observe further investigation are:
1. Making organizational and local government disaster plans open to the public for feedback and potential support for actually financing effective mitigation. Response plans for terrorist incidents might be an exception to public access. 2. Designing systems that will allow the integration of citizens and public organizations into all the phases in the process. 3. Designing citizen participation systems that are not limited to the design of social media systems which may not be as useful for effective collaboration as ones designed for disaster planning, response, and mitigation formulation. 4. Public and private pre-commitment of resources and talents for any aspect of disasters.
An example of a useful everyday system would be a reporting system for any citizen emergency: trouble with a utility service, public government service, accidents, hazards, medical help, etc. This system would record the location, provide maps, track services and backlog of services, and be shared by all the agencies, organizations, and companies involved. At any time, a citizen could see the distribution of the types of events, how many are being serviced, and how many are in a queue. When disasters occur it would then become obvious where the major bottlenecks are developing, occurring, or being handled. This would of course require organized collaboration among many organizations that do not really coordinate today.
